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STUDENT COMMENTS
FEDERAL HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES LEGISLATION:
EFFECTS ON CONSUMER PROTECTION AND
MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY
In the United States, on an average, more than one child dies
each day as a result of accidental poisoning.' As shocking as this
statistic seems, however, it belies the extent of the problem, since an
estimated two and one-half million children swallow poisonous sub-
stances each year2 and, of this figure, eighty-five percent are children
under five years of age.' While many of these incidents involve medi-
cines,4
 some of which are intended to be orally consumed, a significant
number of poisonings result from the accidental ingestion of common
household cleaning aids. 2 •Because they contain hazardous ingredients
which can cause death or serious bodily injury,' and because they are
usually stored in a casual manner in most homes, cleaning products
represent a substantial danger to small children.
The danger has increased as advances in manufacturing tech-
niques and applied chemistry have introduced a variety of household
cleaning products which contain new and more hazardous substances.
In an attempt to meet this problem, Congress in 1927 enacted the
Federal Caustic Poisons Act. 7
 However, neither this legislation, nor
common law theories of manufacturers' liability then current were suf-
ficient to abate the growing number of accidental poisonings by house-
hold products containing hazardous substances. To deal more effec-
tively with the problem, Congress in 1960 introduced the Federal
Hazardous Substances Labeling Act' and, in 1970, the Poison Pre-
vention Packaging Act.°
This comment will examine the common law and early state and
federal legislative attempts to deal with the problem of accidental
poisonings of children. The inadequacies of these early efforts will be
noted to indicate the reasons which prompted congressional enactment
of the Labeling Act. That Act, subsequent amendments which pur-
116 Cong. Rec. 20246 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1970) (remarks of Senator Pearson).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4
 Accidental ingestions of medicines account for 50% of all accidental poisonings. 116
Cong. Rec. 14294 (1970) (remarks of Senator Moss).
6
 Household cleaning aids include products such as furniture polish, liquid drain
cleaner, detergent, silver polish, turpentine and a wide variety of cleaners of a similar
nature found in the home.
0
 A case history which illustrates the serious consequences of the accidental ingestion
of household products containing hazardous substances is cited in 106 Cong. Rec. 6631
(1960) (remarks of Senator Magnuson).
7 Act of Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 489, §§ 1-10, 12, 44 Stat. 1406-10.
15	 § 1261 et seq. (1970).
u Pub. L. No. 91-601, 84 Stat. 1670 (Dec. 30, 1970).
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ported to remedy the Act's deficiencies, and the Packaging Act will be
analyzed. Finally, the overall effectiveness of these later acts in pre-
venting the accidental poisoning of children will be assessed.
I. THE PROBLEM: ITS SCOPE AND COMMON LAW REMEDIES
Although the problem of accidental poisonings is not new, its
scope was first revealed by statistical analysis developed in 1957. In
that year, the National Clearinghouse for Poison Control Centers
(Clearinghouse), established under the auspices of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), collected and tabulated data
from various Poison Control Centers located in the larger metropolitan
areas of the country. 1° The information processed by the Clearinghouse
documented the magnitude of the problem and provided a variety of
additional relevant statistics." Although the data from the first years
of operation were sparse, information compiled by the agency revealed
widespread accidental poisoning among children." More detailed statis-
tics from later years showed that while accidental overdoses of medicine
caused more poisonings than did accidental ingestion of household
products, the latter were responsible for a higher death rate." This
fact indicated that cleaning products containing hazardous substances
were more lethal than medicines and, consequently, presented a greater
danger to young children."
10 In 1957 there were 29 centers representing 19 states. U.S. Bureau of Health Services,
Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bull. July-August 1.967, National Clearinghouse
for Poison Control Centers, Statistical Observations 1 (1967).
11 In addition to statistics concerning accidental ingestions and resulting deaths, the
Clearinghouse provides data tabulating the most frequently ingested products, the duration
of hospitalization after ingestion, and various case studies of accidental poisoning. Id.
12 Statistics showed that deaths among children due to accidental poisonings from
1957-1960 were categorized as follows:
Year Deaths due to drugs
Deaths due to hazardous
household substances
1957 156 374
1958 150 422
1959 180 456
1960 211 445
U.S. Bureau of Health Services, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bull. Sept.-Oct,
1968, National Clearinghouse for Poison Control Centers, Tabulations of 1967 Case Reports
6 (1968).
13 Id. at 2.
14
 Although the number of deaths due to accidental ingestion of hazardous substances
is significantly high, the scope of this problem is obscured because not all cases of accidental.
poisonings are reported to the Clearinghouse. Although many cases are treated by doctors,
not all injuries and ingestions come to the attention of the Clearinghouse. Since Poison
Control Centers are not located in every state, the statistics available reflect only a fraction
of the actual number of ingestions. While the Clearinghouse statistics indicate approxi-
mately 60,000 ingestions in 1965, estimates of the actual number of ingestions are much
higher. U.S. Bureau of Health Services, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bull.
May-June 1966, National Clearinghouse for Poison Control Centers, Statistical Analysis
of Accidental Poisoning 5 (1966). Some sources estimate as many as two and one-half
million ingestions per year. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
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The common law governing products liability was unable to deal
effectively with the problem since (a) the law imposed no meaning-
ful duty on manufacturers to reduce the risk of accidental poisoning,
and (b) injured consumers or the parents of injured children were
provided no viable remedy. Initially, the courts employed the doctrine
of privity to determine products liability: the manufacturer was liable
only to the immediate purchaser of his product with whom he had a
contractual relationship." In effect, the privity rule meant that man-
ufacturers were liable only to retailers and not to consumers, since the
latter rarely, if ever, purchased directly from the manufacturer.
Gradually, the restriction imposed by the doctrine of privity was
eroded by the development of various exceptions to the rule. The first
of these dealt with certain limited products, such as drugs, which were
inherently dangerous and, if improperly prepared, became ultrahazard-
ous to the user." The courts reasoned that since death or severe bodily
injury inevitably resulted from negligence in the manufacturing of
such products, and since the weight of such negligence was more
likely to fall on the consumer, the manufacturer should be held liable,
despite the absence of privity." This same reasoning led to exceptions
involving other inherently dangerous products."
The courts soon realized that there was no valid reason for re-
stricting an injured consumer's right of recovery to situations involving
a limited cla:ss of inherently dangerous products. Serious injury could
result from any type of product which was defective due to a manufac.;
turer's negligence. For this reason, the courts imposed a duty upon all
manufacturers to employ reasonable care in the production and in-
spection of all goods, which, although not inherently dangerous if
properly constructed, constituted a menace to life if improperly pro-
duced." In this way, consumers were able to sue the manufacturer
of a defective product for injuries resulting from his negligence.
Despite these early advances in the common law, which permitted
direct legal action against manufacturers, plaintiffs had considerable
difficulty in establishing manufacturers' liability. To recover, the con-
sumer had to prove both that the manufacturer had been negligent and
that the negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. However,
since a product defect was not conclusive proof of negligence, and,
18 Winterhottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
la Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 455 (Ct. App. 1852). In this case, a dealer in
drugs had mislabeled as harmless extract of dandelion a lethal drug later sold to a con-
sumer.
17
.
 [A]n act of negligence of a manufacturer or vendor which is imminently dan-
gerous to the life or health of mankind, and which is committed in the preparation
or sale of an article intended to preserve, destroy, or affect human life is actionable
by third parties who suffer from the negligence.
The third party referred to by the court was the consumer. Hunt v. J.I. Case Threshing
Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 870 (8th Cir. 1903).
18 Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64 (1870).
19 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (Ct. .App. 1916).
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since it was otherwise difficult to establish fault on the part of a man-
ufacturer, the possibility of recovery was slight. Because of consumers'
difficulty in sustaining the burden of proof, courts began to apply the
doctrine of strict liability, even absent privity, with respect to certain'
products. Thus, a manufacturer was held liable for injury caused by
defects in his product, notwithstanding the consumer's inability to
prove that the defect was caused by the manufacturer's negligence."
The courts first applied the doctrine of strict liability in cases dealing
with food and drink." Gradually, the doctrine was applied to products
designed for intimate bodily use, such as hair dye, soap, and permanent
wave solutions.22 Ultimately, it was expanded to include all defective
products."
Notwithstanding this advance in the common law, a person in-
jured due to the accidental ingestion of a hazardous household product
still had no basis for recovery. Under the doctrine of strict liability,
the consumer had to prove that the product was defective. However,
most injuries from ingestion of cleaning agents involved products
which had been properly fabricated. The dangerous chemicals con-
tained in such products did not constitute a defect; rather, they were
necessary if the product was to clean properly. Thus, there was usually
no basis for imposing strict liability in situations involving accidental
poisonings.
To accord consumers a measure of protection in such cases, courts
in some jurisdictions imposed upon manufacturers the duty to warn
consumers of the hazardous nature of their products. In Cunningham v.
C.R. Pease Home Furnishing Co., 24 the mother of the plaintiff pur-
chased a stove-blacking compound from the defendant who had repre-
sented that it was safe to use on a hot stove. Unknown to the mother
or her daughter, the product contained naphtha, a highly flammable
substance. When the compound was applied to a hot stove it ignited
and seriously injured the daughter. The court held that the manu-
facturer-seller was liable because he had misrepresented the dangerous
20 W, Prosser, Law of Torts 672 (4th ed. 1971).
21 For an analysis of these cases, see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1103-10 (1960).
22 Id. at 1111.
23 Acknowledging the inequity of only applying "strict liability" in food cases, and
noting the expanded application of the doctrine by other courts, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey stated that it saw "no rational basis for differentiating between a Ely in a
bottle of beverage and a defective automobile." Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 383, 161 A.2d 69, 83 (1960). Henningsea further alleviated the consumer's prob-
lem of establishing a privily relationship by holding that the manufacturer's warranty
extended not only to the immediate purchaser, but also to the members of his family
and to anyone using the product with his permission. For discussion relating to strict
liability for defective products see Freedman, "Defect" in the Product: The Necessary
Basis for Products Liability in Tort and in Warranty, 33 Tenn. L. Rev. 323 (1966) ;
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn. L.
Rev. 363 (1965) ; Keeton, Products Liability—Liability Without Fault and the Require-
ment of a Defect, 41 Texas L. Rev. 855 (1963).
24 74 N.H. 435, 69 A. 120 (1908).
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nature of his product in order to induce a sale. The court reasoned that
although under the doctrine of caveat emptor the seller was not bound
to reveal any defects in his product, if he tried to induce a sale by any
representation, it had to be a truthful one. If the mother or daughter
in Cunningham had known that the product contained naphtha or if
they had been warned of the dangers connected with the use of the
compound, the accident might have been avoided. It should be noted,
however, that the decision did not require sellers to reveal, as a matter
of course, the substances contained in their products, even when the
substances made the products hazardous in normal use.
Subsequent decisions expanded the duty from one of mere truthful
representation of the qualities of a product, to an affirmative duty to
warn of the dangers accompanying its use. In Proctor and Gamble
Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court of Marin County,25
 the petitioner sought
to restrain the California Superior Court from enforcing an order
compelling the petitioner to furnish certain information regarding one
of its products. The injured plaintiff in the lower court action had
claimed that the petitioner's product, "Cheer," had caused acute der-
matitis, resulting in permanent disfigurement of her hands. Plaintiff
alleged that the petitioner had failed in its duty to warn of the danger
connected with the use of the product. It was argued that this duty
should be imposed since the manufacturer knew of over a hundred
similar complaints regarding another of its products, "Tide," and, be-
cause "Tide" and "Cheer" contained the same elements, Proctor and
Gamble knew or should have known of the dangerous effects of
"Cheer." Further, if the manufacturer knew of these dangers and did
not warn the plaintiff, then it had failed to perform its required duty
and was thus liable for the plaintiff's injuries. In support of her argu-
ments, the plaintiff alleged that the petitioner had in its files the affi-
davits of 117 people injured by "Tide." These files were the documents
which the Superior Court had ordered the defendant-petitioner to pro-
duce. The appellate court held that the supporting affidavits were based
on hearsay and could not be subpoenaed. However, by way of dicta,
the court stated that if the manufacturer knew or should have known
of the dangers of his product, he had a duty to warn a purchaser of
these dangers.'.
Although courts began to hold that manufacturers had a duty to
warn of known dangers accompanying the normal use of their products,
the common law was not definite as to what constituted an ade-
quate warning. In Bender v. William Cooper and Nephew Inc.,"
the court indicated that it was unnecessary for a manufacturer ex-
plicitly to spell out an unequivocal warning, and that instructions for
use would fulfill the duty to warn if they sufficiently indicated that
the product was dangerous in some way. In Bender, the plaintiff, a
25 124 Cal. App. 2d 157 k 268 P.2d 199 (1954).
20 Id. at 162, 268 P.2d at 202.
27 323 III. App. 96, 55 N.E.2d 94 (1944).
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well-educated person, had purchased defendant's disinfectant for use
in cleaning dog kennels. Although the label on the container stated that
the product was safe and nonirritating, other instructions on the label
cautioned the purchaser to dilute the substance before using it. When
the plaintiff poured the liquid into a can, it splashed into her eyes and
injured her. The plaintiff contended that the label was misleading and
the warning inadequate because neither gave any indication that the
product was harmful if it came into contact with the eyes. The court
reasoned that, since the plaintiff was an educated person, she should
have been able to conclude from the instructions regarding the dilution
of the substance that it was a type of product that should be kept
from contact with the eyes. Therefore, the court found that the plain-
tiff had received adequate warning as to the attendant dangers of the
disinfectant, notwithstanding the other section of the label which indi-
cated that the product was safe and nonirritating.
The result in Bender showed that the court was not willing to im-
pose strict labeling requirements on the manufacturer. The consumer
had to deduce from the nature of the product, and the accompanying
instructions for its use, whether the product was dangerous and, if so,
what the possible extent of that danger might be. This reasoning ig-
nored the likely possibility that the consumer could misinterpret the
instructions and conclude that the product was safe. In this way, de-
cisions like Bender offered no solution to the problem of accidental
poisoning due to hazardous household substances, since there was no
requirement of an unequivocal warning which would alert consumers
to the hazardous nature of the cleaning product.
Shaw v. Calgon" presents another example of an "adequate warn-
ing" at common law. in Shaw the plaintiff accidentally used one of the
defendant's products, "Calgonite," diluted with water, to clean vene-
tian blinds instead of using "Calgon," a weaker cleaning agent pro-
duced by the same manufacturer. "Calgonite" was a dishwashing
solvent which could be used as a household cleanser. However, the label
cautioned that care should be taken to avoid contact with the skin.
The plaintiff contended that the manufacturer was negligent in failing
to give a sufficient warning as to the dangers attending the use of
"Calgonite" since neither an antidote nor a list of the chemical el-
ements in the product was provided. The plaintiff further alleged that
if instructions for an antidote had been printed on the package, she
would have been able to administer some type of appropriate first aid
to mitigate the severity of the chemical burns received. The court
held that there was no authority for the plaintiff's contention that the
label had to include an antidote and an enumeration of the chemical
contents of the product. The court reasoned that since detergents
were not inherently dangerous and since they were used in a variety of
situations without harmful results, instructions for use and a warning
28 35 N.J. Super. 319, 114 A,2d 278 (1955).
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to use' care fulfilled the manufacturer's duty to warn the consumer of
the nature of the product. -
The Shaw court was reluctant to establish requirements for an
adequate warning, concluding that such a determination was a preroga-
tive which clearly belonged to the legislature. The court realized that if
it were to determine the specific requirements of an adequate warning,
and other courts did the same, the result would be varying and con-
flicting requirements. In addition, if a court presumed to determine
the specifications for all labels on hazardous household substances, it
would be exercising a legislative function.
Even where courts were willing to impose liability for failure to
provide adequate warning, such liability did not obtain when the inter-
vening negligence of the user was determined to be the proximate
cause of the injury, rather than the negligent failure of the manufac-
turer to give adequate warning. In Boyd v. Frenchee, 29 a nineteen
month old child died as a result of consuming a small amount of fabric
cleaner produced by the defendant. The parents of the deceased child,
residents of Pennsylvania, brought an action against the manufacturer
for the wrongful death of the child. The parents alleged that the man-
ufacturer negligently failed to warn of the dangers contained in the
product because the label on the cleaning substance failed to indicate
that ingestion of a small amount of the fluid would cause death. This
allegation of insufficient warning was based on a Pennsylvania statute
which required that all products containing poisonous substances had
to bear a label alerting purchasers to the poisonous nature of the
product." The court determined that the legislative intent of the
statute was to regulate the sale of poisonous substances by pharmacies
and not to control the sale of cleaning substances. Moreover, the court
concluded that the actual cause of death was not the absence of cau-
tionary labeling, but the fact that the child ingested the product. The
court held that the manufacturer had a duty to warn of the dangers
surrounding the "intended use" of the product and that he could not
be held liable when the product was not used in the intended manner .m
Notwithstanding the holding in Boyd, decisions in other jurisdic-
tions held that manufacturers were liable for failure to give adequate
warning to consumers despite the intervening negligence of a child. In
Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc.," the mother of the deceased child and
the administrator of the child's estate brought suit against the manu-
facturer of a furniture polish. As a result of ingestion of the polish,
the child had contracted chemical pneumonia and died. The plaintiffs
alleged that the manufacturer was liable for failing to provide an ade-
quate warning. The label stated that the product was combustible and
that it should not be used near fire. In smaller print, the label cautioned
20 37 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
30 35 Pub. Stat. Pa. 901 (1917), as quoted in 37 F. Supp. at 307.
81 Id. at 310.
82 308 F2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
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that the polish contained petroleum distillates- and that it "may .be
harmful if swallowed, especially by children."".
The court held that the mother's negligent failure to keep the
product out of the child's reach barred her recovery. However, the
court further held that the child's injury was dile to the manufacturer's
negligence in providing an insufficient warning of danger and permitted
the administrator of the child's estate to recover against the manu-
facturer. The court was unwilling to consider the child's action a bar
to recovery. The manufacturer contended that he was liable only for
injuries resulting from the intended use of the product and that the
proximate cause of death was the child's misuse of the product. The
court stated that "intended use" was simply another way of expressing
"reasonably foreseeable use." The court concluded that, considering
the nature of the home environment into which the product was intro-
duced, it was reasonably forseeable that a child might swallow the
polish. In addition, the court concluded that the manufacturer had to
give an adequate warning of reasonably foreseeable risks which would
catch the attention of a prudent man and warn him of the nature and
extent of the dangers associated with the product.
Spruill was a significant departure from the trend illustrated in
the prior cases. In Bender, a label which contained no affirmative state-
ment of the dangers surrounding the use of the product, but merely
instructed the purchaser to dilute the substance in water before using,
was held to be an adequate warning. In Boyd, the court held that a
manufacturer only had to warn of dangers surrounding the "intended
use" of the product, but did not have to warn of those dangers beyond
the scope of intended use, such as ingestion by a child. Spruill extended
the meaning of "intended use" to "reasonable foreseeability" and held
that accidental ingestion by a child was a reasonably foreseeable harm
for which the manufacturer had a duty to warn.
Although the decision in Spruill offered substantial assistance to
consumers, the rationale of that case was not accepted in many juris-
dictions. This lack of uniformity was a major deficiency in the common
law treatment of accidental poisoning due to hazardous household
products since such poisoning was an interstate problem amenable to a
uniform, interstate solution. Action at the federal level was necessary
to solve the problem. Prior to 1960, however, the legislation in this
area was inadequate. The Federal Caustic Poisons Act" (hereinafter
the Poisons Act), enacted in . 1927, was the only federal statute to
confront directly the problem of poisonous substances contained in
household products." This statute listed twelve chemicals defined as
83 Id. at 82.
34 Act of Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 489, *I 1-10, 12, 44 Stat. 1406-10.
85
 The only other Federal statutes dealing with hazardous substances were the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 135 (1970), which dealt with
industrial poisons; and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
(1970). However, neither Act addressed the problem of hazardous substances contained
in household products.
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dangerous, caustic or corrosive substances," and required that products
containing these elements be labeled as poison." If this labeling re-
quirement was not met, the package was declared misbranded and
subject to seizure by .the federal government in a process of libel for
condemnation." HoweVer, the Act was soon outdated. Rapid de-
velopment in 1927 of manufacturing and applied chemistry resulted
in many new dangerous chemicals in a wide variety of new cleaning
products. By 1960 the twelve substances enumerated in the Poisons
Act represented only a fraction of the hazardous substances contained
in cleaning products on the market."
State legislation in this area was equally inadequate to deal ef-
fectively with a problem that required interstate solutions. By 1960
only eight states had enacted statutes requiring cautionary labeling on
household products containing hazardous substances. 4 These state
statutes, while similar in many respects, did not provide uniform regu-
lation of such substances. The Connecticut statute,' the most effective
in dealing with the problem of accidental poisonings, defined hazardous
substances and sought to regulate hazardous household products.° In
addition, the statute clearly defined the labeling requirements designed
unequivocally to alert consumers to the dangers presented by the
product.° The Connecticut Act was clear, concise and thorough, and
was limited to dangerous chemical substances commonly found in de-
tergents and other household cleaning agents. On the other hand, the
Vermont statute was a general act not designed exclusively to solve
the problem of accidental poisonings caused by common household
products. The statute dealt with food, drugs and cosmetics in addition
to hazardous household products.' As a result, the labeling require-
ments were inadequate to alert purchasers to the specific dangers
presented by cleaning agents. The Kansas statute' failed to define
hazardous substances and omitted any specifications for labeling re-
quirements, stating only that a warning was necessary." Since the
statute merely required a warning, it added nothing to the common
law duty to warn. Therefore, Kansas courts still faced the problem of
36 The 12 substances defined as poison were: hydrochloric acid, sulphuric acid,
nitric acid, carbolic acid, oxalic acid, salt of oxalic acid, acetic acid, hypochlorous acid,
potassium hydroxide, sodium hydroxide, silver nitrate, and ammonia water. Act of Mar. 4,
1927, ch. 489, § 2(a)(1)-(12), 44 Stat. 1406.
37
 Id. § 2 (b) (3), 44 Stat. 1406.
38
 Id. § 4, 44 Stat. 1408.
39 106 Cong. Rec. 5536 (1960) (remarks of Senator Bush).
40
 The eight states were Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Ohio, Texas,
and Vermont. Id.
11 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. ch. 348 § 19-301 at seq. (1958).
42
 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. di. 348 § 19-302 (1958).
43 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. ch. 348 { 19-303 (1958).
44 Vt. Stat. Ann. ch. 82 § 4051 (1959).
46 Kan. Stat. Ann. ch. 65 §§ 2701 et seq. (1963).
46
 Kan. Stat. Ann. ch. 65 2703 (1963).
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determining whether or not a particular warning adequately alerted
the consumer to the dangers accompanying use of the product.
While the state statutes concerning hazardous substances gen-
erally defined the substances covered and indicated some labeling re-
quirements, they differed substantially as to precisely what words
were required on the label, and what constituted an adequate warning.
In addition, although the definition of hazardous substances was es-
sentially the same, in all but the Kansas statute, the methods used to
determine which products were covered by the definition were indefi-
nite and varied from state to state.' Since these statutes provided no
distinct differentiation between "hazardous" and "non-hazardous," a
substance might be considered highly toxic according to one state's
testing method, toxic according to a different state, and not hazardous
according to another. Thus, manufacturers producing for an interstate
market, subjected to .varying jurisdictional requirements, might com-
ply with one state statute, but fail to comply with another. Compliance
with all the varying statutes was a practical impossibility.
By 1960, then, federal and state legislation and the common law
had been proven ineffective in solving the problem of accidental poi-
soning caused by hazardous substances in household products. The
federal Poisons Act was outdated and failed to encompass all the haz-
ardous chemicals present in various cleaning agents available to con-
sumers. State legislation was also ineffective because only eight states
had enacted statutes directed at the problem of accidental poisoning,
and these varied widely. The common law of products liability, as it
had developed by 1960, also failed to afford the consumer adequate
protection from the dangers accompanying the use of hazardous house-
hold products. Finally, a manufacturer's duty to warn was usually
limited to a duty to warn of reasonably foreseeable injuries, and most
courts concluded that accidental ingestion by a child was not reason-
ably foreseeable." Strict liability of manufacturers usually did not
obtain in cases dealing with accidental poisoning since that theory of
liability was predicated on the fact that the product was defective and
since the injuries in such cases were rarely attributable to a product
defect.
II. THE FEDERAL HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES LABELING ACT
In response to the failure of the statutory and common law to deal
effectively with the problem of accidental poisonings, Congress in 1960
passed the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act" (hereinafter
the Labeling Act). This Act represented the first congressional attempt
to deal specifically with the problem of hazardous substances contained
47
 Compare Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. ch. 348 1 19-301 (1958), with Kan. Stat. Ann. ch.
65	 2701 (1963).
48
 See text at notes 29-33 supra.
40 15 U.S.C. If 1261 et seq. (1970).
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in common household cleaning products. Several factors convinced
Congress that a comprehensive federal statute was the best method
to abate the growing number of accidental ingestions of hazardous
household cleaning agents. Recognizing the inadequacy of existing
legislation, Congress realized that federal regulation was necessary to
control the plethora of new cleaning products on the market, many of
which contained hazardous chemicals. 5° Furthermore, effective ad-
vertising techniques, which created wide demand for such products,
insured the increased introduction of hazardous substances into the
home. It was clear that, absent the compulsion of a federal act, man-
ufacturers would not label their product as poisonous out of fear that
sales would decline due to consumer reluctance to bring a deadly pro-
duct into the home. Since manufacturers did not disclose the chemical
elements of their product nor provide an unequivocal warning, con-
sumers were not aware of the inherent dangers contained in household
cleansers." This unawareness resulted in an increasing number of
accidental ingestions and deaths among children."
Thus, faced with increased numbers of unlabeled dangerous prod-
ucts entering the consumer's home, Congress enacted the Labeling
Act. In general, the Act required that cautionary labeling be provided
on the product package to warn prospective buyers of dangers ac-
companying the use of the product." In addition, the label had to
provide physicians with necessary information regarding chemical
contents and had to include suggested antidotes for dealing with an ac-
cidental ingestion." In this way, cautionary labeling would alert par-
ents to the harmful nature of the product and prompt them to keep
the substance out of the reach of children.
The Act met the recognized need for uniform national legislation
to regulate effectively and fairly the labeling of products containing
hazardous substances. This uniformity was essential since divergent
state standards had adversely affected the consumer as well as the
manufacturer. To meet the divergent and inadequate definitional stan-
dards existing among the various states, Section 1 (f) (1) (A) of the
Labeling Act established a uniform definition of hazardous substances:
Any substance or mixture of substances which (i) is
toxic, (ii) is corrosive, (iii) is an irritant, (iv) is a strong
sensitizer, (v) is flammable, or (vi) generates pressure
through decomposition, heat, or other means, may cause sub-
stantial personal injury or substantial illness during or as a
proximate result of any customary or reasonably foreseeable
60 Approximately 300,000 hazardous household substances were unlabeled when the
Labeling Act was enacted. 106 Cong. Rec. 5536 (1960) (remarks of Senator Bush).
5 4
 Id. at 5537.
52 Id. at 5536-37.
53 15 U.S.C.	 176 1 (P)(I) (1970).
54 15 U.S.C.	 1261(p)(1) (1970).
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•handling or use, including reasonably foreseeable ingestion by
children."
This definition treated directly the problem of accidental poisonings
by focusing the application of the Act primarily on cleaning agents com-
monly found in most homes. The scope of the Act was narrowed to
these substances by section 1(1) (2), which excluded certain products
such as food, drugs, cosmetics and economic poisons." However, the
Act was not strictly limited to cleaning agents, but encompassed any
household product which met the definitional requirements of a hazard-
ous substance. In addition, section 1 circumvented the inadequacies
of state legislation by drawing a distinct line between a hazardous and
nonhazardous substance. This was accomplished by providing specific
methods for determining whether a substance was "toxic, corrosive, an
irritant, a strong sensitizer, flammable, or generated pressure." 6 7
Section 1(f) (1) (A) further limited the definition of a hazardous
substance to products which caused substantial personal injury or sub-
tantial illness." This qualification was intended to insure the effective-
ness of cautionary labeling. Congress realized that if every product
causing some slight injury or discomfort, such as common facial soap
or shampoo, were required to bear cautionary labeling, the purchaser
would soon become anesthetized to any warning at all." Adequate
identification of truly hazardous substances could be achieved only by
limiting cautionary labeling to substances which caused substantial
injury.
The definition also directly focused upon the problem of the rea-
sonable foreseeability of accidental ingestions of hazardous household
products by children. The Act stated that a hazardous substance was
any substance which "may cause substantial personal injury . . . during
or as a proximate result of any customary or reasonably foreseeable
handling or use, including reasonably foreseeable ingestion by chit-
dren."°° This clause eliminated the problem of determining whether
manufacturers could reasonably have foreseen accidental ingestion of
the product by a young child. Manufacturers could no longer escape
55 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f)(1)(A) (1970).
50 The term "hazardous substance" shall not apply to economic poisons subject
to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, nor to foods, drugs
and cosmetics subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, nor to sub-
stances intended for use as fuels when stored in containers and used in the heating,
cooking, or refrigeration system of a house.
15 U.S.C. § 1261(0(2) (1970).
57 15 U.S.C. § 1261(g)-(m) (1970). Detailed regulations and testing procedures for
determining hazardous substances are provided in 21 C.F.R. H 191.10-16 (1971). However,
these methods of determining which substances are hazardous •are criticized as being
inadequate in Zapp, The Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, 17 Food Drug
Cosm. L.J. 104 (1962).
68 15	 § 1261(f)(1)(A) (1970).
60 H.R. Rep. No. 1861, 86th Cong. 2d Sess., to accompany S. 1283, reprinted in 2
U.S. Code, Cong. & Ad. News 2833, 2837 (1960).
80 15 U S.C. § 1261(0(1)(A) (1970).
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liability by arguing that the proximate cause of the injury was not in-
adequate warning, but the ingestion of the substance by the child. The
imposition of strict liability was supported by statistics on deaths re-
sulting from poisoning by accidental ingestion which showed that it
was reasonably foreseeable that children will ingest household sub-
stances." Such liability was further justified by the fact that house-
hold cleaning products are used in every home and are usually within
easy reach of children. Given the natural propensities of young chil-
dren to taste any substance, it is foreseeable that, absent parental
awareness of attendant dangers, children may be poisoned by the haz-
ardous substances contained in common household cleaning products.
Section 2 of the Labeling Act" gave the Secretary of HEW two
important powers which enabled him to deal effectively with the pro-
blem of accidental poisoning caused by hazardous household products.
First, section 2 (a)(1) authorized the Secretary to declare any sub-
stance hazardous whenever he determined that the objectives of the
Act would be better served by such a declaration, even though the
substance was not included in the technical definitions of the Act. In
this manner, even if a product did not meet the toxicity requirements
of the Act," the manufacturer could be required to provide the
cautionary labeling necessary for a toxic substance. This power enabled
the Secretary to eliminate the uncertainty between hazardous and
nonhazardous substances and thereby insure the efficacy of the Act.
If a substance did not fit the specifications for a hazardous substance
but caused frequent and substantial injuries, the Secretary could deter-
mine that such a substance came under the purview of the Act. Thus,
doubt as to the applicability of the Act was resolved without recourse
to adjudication in the courts. Second, under section 2 (b), the Secretary
was authorized to impose additional labeling requirements on products
which presented a special hazard to consumers. Such an imposition
would obtain whenever he determined that the Act's general labeling
requirements were insufficient to protect consumers from the inherent
dangers of a particular product. The additional labeling was intended
61 See note 12 supra.
e2 Section 2(a) (1) defines the Secretary's powers as follows:
Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary such action will promote the
objectives of this chapter by avoiding or resolving uncertainty as to its applica-
tion, the Secretary may by regulation declare to be a hazardous substance, for
the purpose of this chapter, any substance or mixture of substances which he
finds meets the requirements of [section l(f) (1)(A)] of this title.
'CS U.S.C. 1262(a) (1) (1970).
Subsection (b) provides, in relevant part, that:
If the Secretary finds that the requirements of [section 1(p)(1)] are not
adequate for the protection of the public health and safety in view of the special
hazard presented by any particular hazardous substance, he may by regulation
establish such reasonable variations or additional label requirements as he finds
necessary for the protection of the public health and safety. .
15 U.S.C. 1262(b) (1970).
02
 These requirements are provided in 15 U.S.C. 1261(g), (h)(1) (1970).
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to apprise the consumer of the true extent of the danger inherent in
the use of ultrahazardous household products.
Although Section 2 of the Labeling Act seemed to place arbitrary
power in the hands of the Secretary of HEW, such measures were
necessary if the consumer were to be protected. Available data showed
that certain frequently used products, despite low toxicity under La-
beling Act requirements, were hazardous "as a matter of historical
fact"" and that the public would be better protected if additional
labeling apprised them of the real danger. The power vested in the
Secretary was also justified by the "substantial injury" clause of sec-
tion 1. This section categorized as hazardous a substance which could
cause substantial injury, even though its chemical composition fell
below the toxicity specifications of the definitional section of the La-
beling Act." If the Secretary were not given this far-reaching power
of regulation, many dangerous substances which often cause injury
would appear on the market without cautionary labeling. However,
the power of the Secretary of HEW under section 2 was not unlimited;
certain administrative procedures had to be followed before a sub-
stance could be classified as hazardous or ultrahazardous." Further,
there had to be considerable evidence, derived from medical knowledge
and from data processed by the Poison Control Centers, that a product
was one which caused an inordinate number of injuries and that it was
highly dangerous to human life."
The Labeling Act also provided guidelines for determining what
constituted an adequate warning to the consumer. Section 1 (p)
enumerated the necessary elements of an adequate warning. 68
 These
64
 Kerosene is one such substance. According to the definition contained in the
Labeling Act, kerosene is only slightly toxic. However, this substance has caused a high
number of accidents. It has been argued that kerosene manufacturers should be required
to provide additional cautionary labeling because the injuries caused are more like those
resulting from products defined as highly toxic. Zapp, supra note 57, at 111.
65 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (g), (h)(1) (1970).
16
 These administrative procedures are provided in 21 C.F.R. § 191.201 (1971).
Generally, the Secretary of HEW must first publish his proposal to classify a particular
product as ultrahazardous in the Federal Register. Comments may then be submitted by
those manufacturers who will be adversely affected by the proposal. Whenever valid
objections have been submitted by manufacturers, a public hearing must be held and the
proposed regulations are suspended pending the resolution of the hearing.
67 The type of information required and examples of substances declared hazardous
are provided in 21 C.F.R. § 191.7 (1971).
05
 In relevant part, section 1(p) required:
(A) the name and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, distributor
or seller; (B) the common or usual name or the chemical name (if there be
no common or usual name) of the hazardous substance or of each component
which contributes substantially to its hazard ... (C) the signal word "DANGER"
on substances which are extremely flammable, corrosive, or highly toxic; (D) the
signal word "WARNING" or "CAUTION" on all other hazardous substances;
(E) an affirmative statement of the principal hazard or hazards, such as
"Flammable," "Vapor Harmful," "Causes Burns," "Absorbed Through Skin," or
similar wording descriptive of the hazard; (F) precautionary measures describing
the action to be followed or avoided . . . (G) instruction, when necessary or
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requirements served a twofold purpose: (a) manufacturers knew what
was expected of them in terms of adequacy of warning, thus avoiding
the dilemma of varying labeling requirements in state statutes and
common law decisions; and (b) consumers were apprised of the inher-
ent dangers of the product and were provided with an antidote in
case of an accidental ingestion. Finally, the Act provided for the
seizure of nonconforming packages and imposed penalties on offending
manufacturers.° The use of a package which was not properly labeled
subjected the manufacturer to a fine and permitted the Secretary of
HEW to seize the products so packaged by filing a libel of information
in federal district court." These penalties seemed adequate to deter
manufacturers from placing improperly labeled products on the market.
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LABELING ACT
A. Post-Act Statistics
Unfortunately, the Labeling Act was not completely successful
in solving the problem of accidental poisonings caused by household
products containing hazardous substances. Properly labeled products
containing such substances and complying with the Labeling Act were
introduced into interstate commerce, despite the extremely dangerous
nature of their contents. The effectiveness of the Labeling Act was
frustrated by admittance of these products into the marketplace. In
the years immediately following the promulgation of the Act, statistics
compiled by the National Clearinghouse for Poison Control Centers
revealed that accidental ingestions among children under five years of
age were increasing." Although this fact was partly attributable to
increased efficiency in reporting poisonings and to increased public
awareness of the Poison Control Centers, an increase in the actual
rate of ingestions was doubtless a contributing factor, even in the wake
of cautionary labeling.
One important statistic however, indicated that the Labeling Act
appropriate, for first-aid treatment; (H) the word "poison" for any hazardous
substance which is defined as "highly toxic" by subsection (h) of this section;
(I) instructions for handling and storage of packages which require special care
in handling or storage; and (J) the statement ... "Keep out of the reach of
children" or its practical equivalent. .. .
15 U.S.C. § 1261(p) (1) (1970).
°9 15 U.S.C. I§ 1264, 1265, 1267 (1970).
7° 15 U.S.C. * 1265(a) (1970).
71 Ingestion statistics for 1962-1965:
Year	 Number of Ingestions
1962	 40,775
1963	 46,954
1964	 56,097
1965	 63,352
U.S. Bureau of Health Services, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bull. May-June
1966, National Clearinghouse for Poison Control Centers, Statistical Analysis of Acci-
dental Poisoning 5 (1966).
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was somewhat effective. The total number of poisonings attributable
to cleaning and polishing agents was reduced by approximately two
and one half percent in a three year period from 1962 to 1965. 72 In
addition, the number of deaths caused by products containing hazard-
ous substances, exclusive of medicines, reflected a similar decline."
Section 1(p) of the Act, which required a listing of the chemical ele-
ments and an inclusion of an antidote, probably contributed to the
decline in deaths because physicians were able to administer first aid
more rapidly and more effectively. The cautionary labeling itself in-
creased parents' awareness of the inherent danger of various sub-
stances, and consequently, they were probably more careful in the use
and storage of products.
Despite these advances, however, detergents, bleaches, polishes
and disinfectants were among the most frequently ingested products
containing hazardous chemicals." In addition, 1965 statistics revealed
that poisonings caused by cleaning and polishing agents required more
extensive hospitalization than was necessary in cases involving ac-
cidental overdoses of medicine," indicating that hazardous household
substances continued to be more lethal than medicines. While improved
72
 Percentage of total poisonings attributable to cleaning and polishing agents for
1962-1965:
Year	 Percentage
1962	 17.4%
1963	 16.0%
1964	 15.9%
1965	 14.7%
Id.
73 Deaths due to nonmedicinal substances, 1962-1966:
Year	 Number of	 deaths
1962	 425
1963	 454
1964	 388
1965	 379
1966	 345
U.S. Bureau of Health Services, Dept of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bull. Sept.-
Oct. 1968, National Clearinghouse for Poison Control Centers, Tabulations of 1967 Case
Reports 6 (1968).
74 The most frequently ingested product was aspirin, which accounted for 24% of
total ingestions. Soap and detergents, the second highest category, accounted for only
4% of the total ingestions. Of the 10 categories of products most frequently ingested, five
categories represented products regulated by the Labeling Act and together accounted for
14% of all accidental ingestions. U.S. Bureau of Health Services, Dep't of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare, Bull. Sept.-Oct. 1967, National Clearinghouse for Poison Control
Centers, Survey of Products Most Frequently Named in Ingestion Accidents 1 (1967).
75 For example, 4.2% of cleaning agent ingestions required 2 to 3 days of hospitaliza-
tion, while only 2.7% of medicinal ingestions required a comparable period of hos-
pitalization. In addition, 4.0% of cleaning agent ingestions required 4 or more days of
hospitalization while only 0.7% of medicinal ingestions required the same duration of
hospitalization. U.S. Bureau of Health Services, Dept of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Bull. May-June 1966, National Clearinghouse for Poison Control Centers, Statistical
Analysis of Accidental Poisoning 8 (1966).
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labeling • had reduced the total number • of poisonings, .it could not
mitigate the extremely lethal nature of substances contained in the
products. -
B. Judicial Application of the Act
Due to the paucity of cases dealing with hazardous household sub-
stances, it is difficult to appraise the effect of the Labeling Act on the
common law liability of the manufacturer. However, the cases that do
exist present some insight as to how the courts utilized the statute.
In Wilmington Chemical Corporation v. Celebrezze, 7° a federal district
court upheld the power of the Secretary of HEW to require additional
labeling under Section 2 of the Labeling Act. The plaintiff's product,
a water repellant substance, had been labeled in accordance with the
: provisions of the Act. However, because of information which attrib-
uted one death and several injuries to the product, the Secretary re-
quired the inclusion of additional cautionary labeling on the water
proofing compound. The manufacturer brought an action to deter-
mine whether the Secretary of HEW had the power to require the
additional labeling.
In upholding the Secretary's right to require additional labeling,
the court reasoned that, since the prime purpose of the Labeling Act
was to protect the public, the Secretary had a duty to pursue that pur-
pose to its fulfillment, even to the extent of requiring additional label-
ing on a package previously approved. The court was unwilling to
substitute its own judgment for that of an administrative agency
possessing expertise in such matters and authorized to determine
labeling requirements. However, the court cautioned that such deter-
minations would not be upheld if it were shown that the agency had
clearly abused its discretionary power. This caveat indicated that the
Secretary was still required to follow the basic requirements of the
Labeling Act, and was empowered only to prescribe specifications
commensurate with the degree of danger presented by a particular
product.
In U.S. v. 7 Cases, Cracker Balls," the Secretary of HEW filed a
libel of information pursuant to the Labeling Act against the manu-
facturer of cracker balls, small fireworks about the size of a pencil
eraser. The government alleged that, since the cracker balls resembled
candy, it was reasonably foreseeable that a child would ingest them.
The government argued that, accordingly, the cracker balls should be
•subjected to the labeling requirements of the Act. The court held that,
because cracker balls were flammable and generated pressure through
decompression, they came under Section 1(f) (A) of the Labeling Act
and were a hazardous substance requiring a cautionary label. Refer-
ring again to section 1 (f) (A) the court reasoned that the product
could cause "substantial personal injury as a proximate result of a
76 229 F. Supp. 168 (N.D. DI. 1964).
TT 253 F. Supp. 771 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
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reasonably foreseeable use." Although this case dealt with a toy rather
than a household cleaning product, the opinion indicated that the
Labeling Act was useful in determining the tort liability of a manu-
facturer of a hazardous substance. The court noted that the Act pro-
vided a specific statutory standard for determining whether a sub-
stance was hazardous and whether the resulting injury was reasonably
foreseeable.
In Courtney v. American Oil Co.," however, a state court strictly
construed the Labeling Act regarding the issue of reasonable fore-
seeability. In that case, a gasoline station manager had sold an un-
marked container of gasoline to two children. Following the sale, one
of the children was injured when his playmate ignited the gasoline.
The father of the injured boy brought an action against the manu-
facturer, alleging that the product was a hazardous substance and
that it had been sold without the cautionary labeling prescribed by the
Labeling Act. The court held that, at most, violation of the Labeling
Act constituted negligence, but that absent more compelling evidence,
it was not the proximate cause of the injuries sustained. Strictly con-
struing the Act, the court held that the intentional lighting of the gas-
oline was not a "reasonably foreseeable use" under the Act, and that
the defendant was therefore not liable for the resulting harm. The
court was unwilling to expand the purview of the Act beyond the precise
language of section 1(f) (A), which provided that reasonably foreseeable
use included "reasonable foreseeable ingestion by children!" 1°
It is submitted that although Courtney dealt with an injury to a
child resulting from the ignition of a substance, rather than the in-
gestion of one, there is little substantive difference between the two
types of misuse. Both seem to fall within the scope of "reasonably
foreseeable use" as that phrase is used in the Labeling Act. The Act's
contemplation of "reasonably foreseeable ingestion by children" should
not restrict the meaning of the phrase "reasonably foreseeable use" to
ingestion alone; rather, it should more reasonably encompass all gen-
eral acts of misuse by children whenever those are foreseeable.
A conclusion similar to that in Courtney was reached by another
state court in Steagall v. Dot Manufacturing Corp." This case in-
volved a cook at an institution who had purchased a drain solvent
produced by the defendant. The cook was seriously burned when he
accidentally overturned a bottle of the drain solvent which had been
placed uncapped on a high shelf by an unidentified third person. The
cook sued the manufacturer, alleging that the container was unsafe
and that the manufacturer had negligently failed to provide an ade-
quate warning of the highly corrosive nature of the product. The
court concluded that, although the violation of the Labeling Act con-
stituted negligence per se, no liability attached because there was no
78 220 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1968).
7 D 15 U.S.C. § 1261(1) (1) (A) (1970) (emphasis added).
80 223 Tenn. 428, 446 S.W.2d 515 (1969).
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causal connection between the injury and the negligence. The court
reasoned that the intervening negligence of the third person was suffi-
cient to break the causal connection between the manufacturer's
failure to warn and the plaintiff's injuries.
Cases such as Courtney and Steagall indicated that the Labeling
Act was inadequate to protect consumers against the dangers of haz-
ardous household products. In Steagall, despite the language of the
Labeling Act, proximate cause and contributory negligence remained
formidable barriers to recovery, as in earlier common law. Courtney
illustrated the possible strict interpretation courts were likely to im-
pose on the statutory language of "reasonably foreseeable ingestion."
Moreover, in no case did a court use the Act to extend the manu-
facturer's obligation beyond a mere duty to warn. Since hazardous
household substances were seldom defective, courts were reluctant to
impose strict liability for injuries connected with the product where
there was compliance with the Act's labeling requirements. Conse-
quently, once the manufacturer had affixed a cautionary label to a
product, his duty was discharged. If a child accidentally ingested the
properly labeled product, the manufacturer was not held liable. Mani-
festly, additional regulation was necessary to reduce the number of
injuries to children caused by ingestion of hazardous household sub-
stances.
IV. SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION DESIGNED TO SUPPLEMENT THE
LABELING ACT
A. The 1966 Amendment to the Labeling Act
Not only was the Act of no use in expanding a manufacturer's
liability, it also had little or no effect in mitigating the dangers inherent
in certain ultrahazardous substances. Congress realized that some prod-
ucts, though in reality too dangerous for consumer use, were legally
marketable so long as they were properly labeled. Certain household
products contained substances which enhanced cleaning ability but
which rendered the product ultrahazardous in normal use. Such prod-
ucts could not be made safe merely by requiring cautionary label-
ing." A warning could not prevent the accidental splashing of a power-
ful cleaning fluid into the user's eyes, nor could it prevent the inhalation
of harmful fumes emitted by some cleaning agents. If a product was so
lethal that a few teaspoonsful could cause death to a child, the re-
quired warning would not make the product any less deadly. Therefore,
Congress decided that a more reasonable solution to the problem was an
outright banning of such substances. In this way, harmful products
would be prevented from entering interstate commerce and the danger
which they created would be entirely removed.
81 One such product, a water proofing agent, had a flash point so low that only a
professional could use it safely. As a result of this extremely high flammability, many
consumers were seriously burned. 112 Cong. Rec. 9525 (1966) (remarks of Senator
Magnuson).
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It was this reasoning which led to enactment of the 1966 Amend-
ment to the Hazardous Substances Labeling Act." Under this statute,
the Secretary of HEW was authorized to ban any product which
could not be made adequately safe for consumer use by proper caution-
ary labeling. Once the Secretary made such a determination, the banned
product was not permitted on the market. The application of the pro-
vision was not limited exclusively to hazardous household products,
but also included toys and any articles intended for use by children."
The rationale for enacting the statute was to protect the public health
and welfare from products which could not be used safely in the home,
even when they were properly labeled. In this way, the Amendment
added' to the manufacturer's duty to warn another obligation, that of
refraining from the manufacture of unusually hazardous household
products.
The Amendment represented a necessary and effective supplement
to the Labeling Act. That Act was based on the premise that lack of
adequate warning and resultant parental unawareness of the potential
danger of cleaning products were the major causes of accidental mis-
use among young children." However, in enacting the Labeling Act,
Congress had failed to appreciate the fact that no matter how well
informed parents were, accidental ingestion and other misuse would
result. Since children under five years of age cannot read cautionary
labeling, a mere warning was insufficient; the effectiveness of the Label-
ing Act could be assured only if parents read the warning and carefully
guarded the hazardous product. Statistics indicated that reliance on
parental care was unsound because accidental ingestions increased
after the promulgation of the Labeling Acts° Most accidental poison-
ings occurred not because parents were unaware of the lethal aspects of
the product, but because children can gain easy access to such a pro-
duct no matter how safely it is stored. Thus, if the purpose of the
Labeling Act was to prevent accidental misuse of harmful substances,
the Amendment was a logical and effective approach, since it permitted
62 The Amendment provides that:
The term "banned hazardous substance" means (A) any toy, or other article
intended for use by children, which is a hazardous substance, or which bears or
contains a hazardous substance in such manner as to be susceptible of access by
a child to whom such toy or other article is entrusted; or (B) any hazardous
substance intended, or packaged in a form suitable, for use In the household,
which the Secretary by regulation classifies as a "banned hazardous substance"
on the basis of a finding that, notwithstanding such cautionary labeling as is or
may be required under this chapter for that substance, the degree or nature of
the hazard involved in the presence or use of such substance in households is
such that the objective of the protection of the public health and safety can be
adequately served only by keeping such substance, when so intended or packaged,
out of the channels of interstate commerce. .. .
15 U.S.C. § 126f(q) (1) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (1964).
63 15 U.S.C. § 1261(0 (1)(A) (1970).
84 106 Cong. Rec. 5537 (1960) (remarks of Senator Bush).
85 See note 71 supra.
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the Secretary of HEW to prohibit the sale of substances which had
caused serious injury or death in an inordinate number of cases.
A recent development illustrates the efficacy of the powers granted
to the Secretary of HEW under the Amendment. Using these powers,
the Secretary moved to ban carbon tetrachloride as a hazardous sub-
stance,' In support of this declaration, HEW presented exhaustive
data on the dangers present in and attendant upon the use of carbon
tetrachloride. The most significant finding was that products contain-
ing the substance emitted deadly fumes." This danger was compounded
by the fact that the substance was used in many household cleaning
agents, and was therefore present in many homes. Cautionary labeling
was wholly ineffective to protect the public in this situation because
the product could be extremely lethal even when used in the prescribed
manner. Consequently, the Secretary of HEW determined that the only
way to protect the public health and to insure the safety of consumers
was to prohibit the substance from the market. Accordingly, the Sec-
retary declared carbon tetrachloride to be a banned hazardous sub-
stance and thus excluded it from interstate commerce."
Clearly, the most effective method of protecting consumers from
products containing hazardous substances is an outright banning of
those products. However, since many of them are useful, a solution
short of extensive banning is preferable. Furthermore, the fact that
the Secretary only twice invoked the power of the Amendment indicated
his reluctance to take such drastic action except in the most extra-
ordinary circumstances &°
B. The Poison Prevention Packaging Act
In an attempt to provide a viable alternative to extensive ban-
ning, and to expand the protection of young children as regards ac-
cidental poisoning, the Poison Prevention Packaging Act" (hereinafter
the Packaging Act) was enacted. The need for additional protective
measures was emphasized by the persistent increase in accidental
poisonings. caused by hazardous household substances. Statistics pro-
vided by the National Clearinghouse for Poison Control Centers in-
dicated that, by 1969, accidental ingestions and accompanying deaths
remained at a high level!". Detergents and disinfectants were still
86 . 35 Fed, Reg. 13198 (1970).
87 This finding was based on 23 documented cases, some involving multiple poison-
ings, which had accounted for 15 deaths and 21 serious poisonings. Id. at 13202.
88 Id. at 13204. See also 21 C.F.R. § 191.9(a) (2) (1971).
88
 Only two hazardous household substances have been banned by the Secretary
under the Amendment: carbon tetrachloride and extremely flammable waterproofing
compounds. 21 C.F.R. § 191.9 (1971).
°° Pub. L. No. 91-601, 84 Stat. 1670 (Dec. 30, 1970).
81 In 1969, 76,155 cases of accidental ingestions were reported among children under
five years of age. U.S. Buread of Health Services, Dep't of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, Bull. Sept.-Oct. 1970, National .Clearinghouse for Poison Control Centers, Tabula-
tions of 1969 Reports 5 (1970).
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among the ten most frequently ingested products containing hazardous
substances, with bleach and polish ranking high in the group."
In seeking a solution which would effectively counter the acceler-
ating trend of accidental poisonings, Congress explored the possibility
of utilizing various types of safety packaging which would make it
difficult or impossible for children to open packages containing harm- -
ful substances. Test results offered convincing evidence that specially
designed containers could significantly reduce the number of acci-
dental poisonings among children under five years of age." Other tests
indicated that accidental poisonings due to medicines and hazardous
household products could be reduced by as much as ninety percent."
By reducing the number of such accidents, safety containers provided
a viable alternative to banning since they effectively diminished the
danger accompanying use of some necessary but hazardous substances.
Safety packaging of products such as aspirin, barbiturates and other
medicines would obviate the need to eliminate extremely useful pro-
ducts. Although household cleaning products are not absolutely neces-
sary, and are of less social importance than medicine, they do serve
a valid purpose and should be preserved if possible.
Although Congress realized the need for safety containers, there
was disagreement as to how extensive safety packaging legislation
should be." The dispute centered upon the need for having some prod-
ucts available in nonsafety packages. Since most products were avail-
able in more than one package size, the Senate proposed that a nonsafety
container should be marketed in only one size, for the aged and the
handicapped who might otherwise be unable to open the package,
with all other sizes packaged in safety containers." However, the
House of Representatives disagreed, feeling that a single, one size
safety package was sufficient to achieve the intended results of the
Packaging Act—the protection of children." In joint conference the
proponents of the Senate version of the bill argued that manufacturers,
concerned with effective and economical marketing, would devote little
advertising money toward safety packaging if safety containers were
required for only one size of their product. As a result, consumers
would remain unaware of the availibility of safety containers. In ad-
dition, economy-minded housewives who normally purchase large sizes
92 Products which could be classified as household cleaning aids accounted for 18.1%
of total ingestions among children under five .years of age, while aspirin accounted for
19% of that total. Id. at 2.
93 The tests, conducted in Canada, extended over a period of VA years and resulted
in a decline in accidental poisonings from 2,000 per year to 3 per year. Madigan General
Hospital in Washington state reported a 97% reduction in accidental poisonings aftei the
introduction of safety packaging in that area. 115 Cong. Rec. 12279 (1969) (remarks of
Senator Moss).
94 116 Cong. Rec. 14294 (1970) (remarks of Senator Moss). 	 •
115 H.R. Rep. No. 1642, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany S2162, reprinted in 3U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 5326, 5327-28 (1970). 	 , •
93 Id. at 5328.
97 Id.
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of a product would not be attracted to standard-sized safety packages,
and retailers would probably not allocate large areas of shelf space to
the standard-sized safety package, since more room would be needed
for the numerous nonsafety containers. Furthermore, if only one size
were available, retailers would not stock a large inventory of the safety
containers. Consequently, the most readily available containers of a
multisized product would not be in safety packaging. Congress finally
adopted the Senate version of the bill."
Under the Packaging Act, safety packaging requirements cut
across product lines and included food, drugs, economic poisons and
fuels as well as common household cleaners.°° In order to clarify what
products required safety packaging, the Act encompassed any product
which contained substances defined as hazardous according to the
specifications of the Labeling Act.i°° The "special packaging" required
for these products was defined as "packaging that is designed to be
significantly difficult for children under five years of age to open."'°'
The Act authorized the Secretary of HEW, in consultation with vari-
ous technical advisors, to establish specifications for the packaging of
any household substance, provided that "the degree or nature of the
hazard to children in the availability of such substance, by reason of
its packaging, is such that special packaging is required to protect
children from serious personal injury."102 In addition to requiring
"special packaging," the Act also permitted the Secretary to prohibit
the packaging of a product containing a hazardous substance in a
container or fashion especially attractive to children.'" The rationale
behind this provision was based on the fact that many cleaning fluids
were contained in bottles which resembled soft drinks and which often
had a pleasant fruit odor, attracting small children and causing them to
swallow the liquid.'"
While the ostensible purpose of the Packaging Act was to extend
consumer protection and to reduce accidental poisonings among young
children, the actual result may be to the contrary. It is submitted that
08 Section 4(a) of the Act provides:
For the purpose of making any household substance which is subject to a
standard established under section 3 readily available to elderly or handicapped
persons unable to use such substances when packaged in compliance with such
standard, the manufacturer or packer, as the case may be, may package any house-
hold substance, subject to such a standard, in packaging of a single size which
does not comply with such standard. ...
Pub. L. No. 91-601 { 4, 84 Stat. 1670 (Dec. 30, 1970).
°° Pub. L. No. 91-601 2(2), 84 Stat. 1670 (Dec. 30, 1970).
100
 Pub. L. No. 91-601 § 2(2)(A), 84 Stat. 1670 (Dec. 30, 1970).
101 Section 2(4) further qualifies the definition of "special packaging" as meaning
that which is ". . . not difficult for normal adults to use properly, but does not mean
packaging which all such children cannot open...." Pub. L. No. 91-601 § 2(4), 84 Stat.
1670 (Dec. 30, 1970).
102 Pub. L. No. 91-601 1 3(a) (1), 84 Stat. 1670 (Dec. 30, 1970).
103
 Pub. L. No. 91-601 § 3(d), 84 Stat. 1670 (Dec. 30, 1970).
104 Consumer Reports, Sept. 1971, at 530.
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the most effective means of protecting children from accidental poison-
ings due to hazardous household substances was the 1966 Amendment
to the Labeling Act, which permitted the Secretary of HEW to ban
certain ultrahazardous substances. Although the Packaging Act did not
abrogate the Amendment, and although the Secretary retained his
power to ban ultrahazardous substances, the Packaging Act substan-
tially limited this power. In order to authorize a ban under the Amend-
ment, the Secretary had to demonstrate that the product was so
dangerous that it could not be made safe by any means other than pro-
hibition. However, under the Packaging Act, although a product may
be extremely dangerous, it cannot be banned if it can be made safe
through "child-proof" safety packaging. Thus, HEW may only condi-
tionally ban a product until it is packaged in adequate safety contain-
ers.
Such a result occurred when the Secretary of HEW proposed a
ban on certain ultrahazardous liquid drain cleaners.'" The Secretary
proposed that the drain cleaners, due to their ultrahazardous nature,
would be banned unless marketed in safety packages. To avoid the
financial losses attendant upon such a ban, manufacturers elected to
use safety packaging and continued to market their product.'" Be-
cause of the restriction imposed by the Packaging Act, the Secretary of
HEW could not fully utilize his Amendment power to permanently
ban this ultrahazardous product.
It is submitted that such results under the Packaging Act are
unfortunate since the real strength of the 1966 Amendment lay in its
power to compel manufacturers to produce a safe product, rather than
a safely packaged product. A safely packaged product can still cause
serious injury if ingested or otherwise misused. More extensive appli-
cation of the power to ban would compel manufacturers of household
cleaning products to use available nonhazardous chemicals as a base
for their products, rather than toxic or corrosive ones.'
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act has been law
for a decade, the 1966 Amendment for half as long, and the Poison
Prevention Packaging Act for only a year. The cumulative impact of
these statutes has been ineffective to alleviate significantly the problem
of accidental poisoning among young children. The number of injuries
and deaths due to the accidental ingestion of hazardous household
cleaning substances remains substantially unchanged since 1960, when
the Labeling Act was enacted. Cautionary labeling, as provided by
los The proposed ban was directed at drain cleaners containing 10% or more of
sodium and/or potassium hydroxide. .35 Fed. Reg. 17746 (1970).
100 Drano, one of the drain solvents in question, is now marketed in the required
safety package. Consumer Reports, Sept. 1971, at 531.
107 Consumer Reports, Sept., 1971, at 530. Consumer Reports indicates that sub-
stitute chemicals are available for certain products and that they could provide a viable
alternative to hazardous chemicals.
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the Labeling Act, cannot solve the problem because regardless of the
adequacy of the warning, parents will continue to be careless with
hazardous household cleaning aids. Although Congress amended the
Labeling Act to permit the Secretary of HEW to ban ultrahazardous
substances, the power was not used extensively nor effectively. Further-
more, enactment of the Poison Prevention Packaging Act diminished
the effectiveness of the Amendment by providing an alternative to
prohibition. Safety packaging is only a limited solution to the problem
of accidental poisoning and is no more effective than cautionary label-
ing, because parental carelessness will still allow children to obtain
access to the hazardous substance.
To achieve the proposed goal of the Labeling Act and the Packag-
ing Act—the protection of children from accidental poisoning—the
power to ban products containing ultrahazardous substances must be
fully restored to the Secretary of HEW. To accomplish this end, it
may be necessary to amend the Packaging Act with a provision per-
mitting the Secretary of HEW to ban all ultrahazardous substances,
notwithstanding the use of safety packaging.
RICHARD E. BIRD
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